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Imitation by combination: preschool
age children evidence summative
imitation in a novel problem-solving
task
Francys Subiaul1*, Edward Krajkowski1, Elizabeth E. Price2 and Alexander Etz1
1 The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA, 2 Centre for Behaviour and Evolution, Institute of Neuroscience,
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Children are exceptional, even ‘super,’ imitators but comparatively poor independent
problem-solvers or innovators. Yet, imitation and innovation are both necessary
components of cumulative cultural evolution. Here, we explored the relationship
between imitation and innovation by assessing children’s ability to generate a solution
to a novel problem by imitating two different action sequences demonstrated by
two different models, an example of imitation by combination, which we refer to
as “summative imitation.” Children (N = 181) from 3 to 5 years of age and across
three experiments were tested in a baseline condition or in one of six demonstration
conditions, varying in the number of models and opening techniques demonstrated.
Across experiments, more than 75% of children evidenced summative imitation, opening
both compartments of the problem box and retrieving the reward hidden in each.
Generally, learning different actions from two different models was as good (and in some
cases, better) than learning from 1 model, but the underlying representations appear to
be the same in both demonstration conditions. These results show that summative
imitation not only facilitates imitation learning but can also result in new solutions to
problems, an essential feature of innovation and cumulative culture.
Keywords: imitation, social learning, innovation, cultural learning, problem-solving, cumulative culture, children,
learning
Introduction
Human children have been described as “cultural magnets” (Flynn, 2008), absorbing and
transmitting the habits of their parents and society as a whole with exquisite ﬁdelity. Yet,
despite children’s exceptional imitative abilities as well as their sophisticated causal (Gopnik et al.,
2001; Gopnik and Schulz, 2004) and technological (Defeyter et al., 2009; Cook and Sobel, 2011)
knowledge, children are poor problem-solvers or innovators (Cutting et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2012;
Chappell et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014b). In a series of studies, Beck et al. (2011), Chappell
et al. (2013) demonstrated that children younger than seven excel at imitating tool-making for the
purposes of achieving a goal (i.e., tool-manufacture), but these same children cannot independently
make the same tool to achieve the same goal (i.e., tool-innovation). This result is not restricted to
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urban children who might have few pressures to innovate
given the availability of mass-produced toys. Cross-cultural
research shows that San children in Southern Africa—where
few commercial toys are available and there is considerable
pressure to create new toys and recreational activities—are also
poor problem-solvers or innovators (Nielsen et al., 2014b).
Equally surprising is the fact that when tasks are made
suﬃciently complex, human adults are also poor innovators.
In fact, novel innovations or independent invention is rare
in adult humans (Lewis and Laland, 2012; McCaﬀrey, 2012).
Together, these results indicate that while humans excel at
imitating and propagating existing cultural practices (i.e., cultural
transmission), they are poor at creating novel cultural variants,
themselves.
Such results have led many to conceptualize imitation and
innovation as mutually exclusive concepts (Ramsey et al., 2007;
Legare and Nielsen, in press). According to this view, whereas
imitation is a quintessential social learning mechanism involving
the faithful reproduction of others’ responses, innovation
is thought of as the prototypical asocial learning process
that involves independently generating solutions to problems
(Kummer and Goodall, 1985; Ramsey et al., 2007; Reader
et al., 2011; Legare and Nielsen, in press). For instance,
Ramsey et al. (2007) in a review of the literature describe
innovation as, “. . .the process that generates in an individual
a novel learned behavior that is not simply a consequence of
social learning. . .” (p. 395). But what if problem-solving or
innovation is not primarily the result of novel independent
discovery, at which children and adults are generally poor, but
is instead mediated in some instances by imitative learning,
a skill at which humans of all ages excel. Richerson and
Henrich (2012) suggest that “Learning mechanisms that. . .
blend information from diﬀerent models allow learners to
eﬀectively aggregate information across models and reduce
transmission noise” (p. 42). From this it follows that one way
to individually generate novel behaviors (i.e., innovation) is
through the aggregation and combination of responses from
multiple models (i.e., social learning). That is, the novel,
“individually” generated solution to a problem is the result
of summing up diﬀerent behaviors that were socially learned
from diﬀerent models. As such, imitation by combination may
represent a middle ground between social and asocial learning,
with imitation mediating the transmission of information from
multiple models and the individual producing a new action
that is an amalgamation or the summation of socially learned
responses, akin to “the Ratchet Eﬀect” (Tomasello et al.,
1993).
But despite young children’s impressive imitative abilities,
it is unclear to what degree young children, who stand to
beneﬁt the most from cultural learning, are simply “cultural
magnets,” faithfully replicating what they’ve observed in an
eﬀort to solve familiar problems (Flynn, 2008) or whether
children are also “cultural innovators,” individually combining
diﬀerent responses learned from diﬀerent models to solve novel
problems. While the former does not provide much opportunity
for innovation given that the child only replicates existing
behaviors without alteration, the latter aﬀords greater behavioral
ﬂexibility, allowing children to aggregate multiple responses1
and sources of knowledge in an eﬀort to ﬁnd optimal solutions
to new problems, something that is essential for cumulative
cultural evolution (i.e., ‘the ratchet eﬀect’). To that end, the
present study asked: Can preschool age children solve novel
problems by combining diﬀerent responses from diﬀerent models?
To answer this question we used a novel problem box to assess
preschool age children’s ability to combine diﬀerent types of
responses demonstrated by 2 model to solve a novel problem (or
innovate)2.
Previous research has shown that children beneﬁt from
observing multiple models (Bandura andMenlove, 1968; Schunk,
1987; Herrmann et al., 2013). For instance, Schunk (1987)
showed that 10-years-old children paired with diﬀerent peers
who demonstrated how to solve a math problem (e.g., subtracting
fractions) learn better than children exposed to a single model.
Herrmann et al. (2013) demonstrated a comparable eﬀect with
preschool age children using an instrumental task. However, in
all these studies, the diﬀerent models demonstrated the same
response or rule type (e.g., solving fractions), rather than diﬀerent
responses or components of an event sequence. As such, in these
studies there was no opportunity to combine diﬀerent types of
responses across models to achieve a goal (or optimal outcome).
Nonetheless, there is evidence from research on children’s causal
reasoning that preschool age children and even infants can
combine the eﬀects of diﬀerent objects across diﬀerent events
to generate accurate causal inferences. For instance, using the
“blicket detector” task, Gopnik and colleagues (Gopnik et al.,
2001; Sobel and Kirkham, 2007; Walker and Gopnik, 2014)
presented participants with various conditions where one or two
objects alone or in combination activated the blicket detector.
Children as young as 18months of agemade the correct inference
regarding whether one or two objects were required to activate
the blicket detector, combining the diﬀerent eﬀects of individual
objects to generate an accurate causal inference. Although
outside the social domain, these results demonstrate that very
young children are capable of generating novel solutions to
problems (i.e., how to activate the blicket detector) by aggregating
and combining diﬀerent sources of causal information across
diﬀerent conditions and objects.
The combination of imitative responses to solve a novel
problem and innovate, however, may present children with
a unique suite of challenges. Imitating actions on objects is
a multi-sensory and computationally complex problem that
involves identifying the relevant actions and their respective
goals, accurately sequencing those actions and mapping them
to targets in distinct location(s) in space, while generating and
executing a matching motor plan that may or may not be
visually opaque (Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 2002; Brass and
Heyes, 2005). These challenges are compounded when the
1It is important to emphasize that combining diﬀerent imitative responses is not
equivalent to emulation, which is characterized by selective imitation or replicating
either the model’s intended goal or the achieved end-states using idiosyncratic
means (Subiaul et al., 2015). In summative imitation, two or more demonstrated
responses are faithfully imitated together.
2Following Kummer and Goodall (1985) we will use problem-solving and
innovation interchangeably throughout.
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task requires imitatively combining diﬀerent types of responses
across diﬀerent models separated by time and space. Speciﬁcally,
keeping track of diﬀerent individuals, copying diﬀerent actions,
while ignoring irrelevant information such as diﬀerences in
size, posture or dress, should increase memory, attention and
inhibitory demands. This is a particular concern given that
preschoolers have poor executive functioning skills; speciﬁcally,
poor inhibitory control and attention (Garon et al., 2008; Best
and Miller, 2010), which are factors that are known to dampen
imitation ﬁdelity (Subiaul and Schilder, 2014).
In Experiment 1, we presented preschool age children with
a problem box. We used a problem box because a number of
studies have shown that preschoolers are exceptionally accurate
at imitating multi-step responses using problem boxes (Horner
and Whiten, 2005; Nielsen, 2006; Hopper et al., 2007; Lyons
et al., 2007, 2011; McGuigan et al., 2007). Using this task
we sought to answer the following questions: (a) Do children
imitatively combine responses across models when problem-
solving? Speciﬁcally, when problem-solving do children imitate
both demonstrated responses relative to a Baseline condition,
where no demonstration is provided? And, (b) When problem-
solving, is imitation ﬁdelity in the 2 model demonstration
comparable to imitation ﬁdelity in the 1 model demonstration
where children do not have to imitatively combine responses?
Hypotheses: If children problem-solve by summative
imitation, those in the 2 model demonstration condition
should (a) generate more target responses than children
in Baseline, (b) open both compartments more often than
children in Baseline, and (c) performance should not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from children who learned from a single
model.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
A total of 77 children (Females = 44), ranging in age from 3 to
5 years (M = 3.88, SD = 0.73) were recruited and tested in the
Discovery Room in the National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institute, Washington, DC, USA using approved
IRB protocols from both the Smithsonian and the George
Washington University. Eight other children were excluded due
to video recording errors and four additional children were
excluded due to experimenter error. We received informed
consent from participants’ parent(s) or legal guardian(s), and we
obtained informed assent from the child immediately prior to
testing.
Materials
The experimental apparatus was a problem box with two
compartments (upper, lower) and two “defenses” consisting
of Velcro strips (top, side) in distinct colors (red, blue) that
prevented the compartments from opening (Figure 1). Two
stickers were hidden in each compartment. After the child found
the stickers, they placed them on a white piece of paper (8.5 in. X
11 in.). The experiment was video recorded for data coding at a
FIGURE 1 | Problem box task. (A) Closed problem box showing the two
defenses (blue and red). (B) Opened problem box showing both upper and
lower compartments.
later time. In order to simplify the task, only half of the box was
rendered operable.
Experimental Groups
Groups included a trial and error (Baseline) learning group and
two experimental demonstration (1 and 2 model) conditions in
which children ﬁrst observed a model(s) demonstrate in person
(live) how to open the box three consecutive times.
Baseline
An experimenter asked the child how many stickers they thought
were in the box. Regardless of their answer, the experimenter said,
“There are two stickers in the box.” And then, encouraged the
child to ﬁnd the two stickers in the box. No additional instruction
or demonstration was provided.
Demonstration conditions
There were two types of demonstrations:
1 Model demonstration
A model approached the box, said, “Watch me,” then removed
the ﬁrst defense (R) and opened (O) the corresponding
compartment. The same model then proceeded to remove the
second defense (R) and open the second (O) compartment
(RORO). Then the model returned the box to its original
state and repeated the actions described above two more times
(three demonstrations opening the upper compartment and three
demonstrations opening the lower compartment).
2 Model demonstration
The ﬁrst model approached the box, said, “Watch me,” removed
the ﬁrst defense (R) and then opened (O) the corresponding
compartment. The same model then returned the box to its
original state and repeated the demonstration two more times
(three demonstrations opening one of the two compartments).
Following the third demonstration, the model walked out
of view of the child. A second model approached the box,
said, “Watch me,” removed the second defense (R), and
opened (O) the corresponding compartment (RO – RO). The
second model then returned the box to its original state
and repeated the demonstrated action two more times (three
demonstrations opening the other compartment). Following the
third demonstration, the model walked out of view of the child.
A third experimenter, who sat with the child throughout the
demonstration, faced them and asked, “Do you remember how
many stickers are in the box?” If the child answered correctly,
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the experimenter said, “That’s right! There are two stickers in the
box. Can you ﬁnd the two stickers in the box?” If they answered
incorrectly, the experimenter said, “There are two stickers in the
box. Can you ﬁnd the two stickers in the box?”
Both demonstration conditions followed an alternating
pattern, RO RO, where actions (defense removal) and goals
(opening compartments) were presented in a causally logical,
alternating fashion. Following each demonstration, the model
returned the box to its original state and repeated this
demonstration two more times. The number of demonstrations
in the 1 and 2 model conditions was the same. In both
demonstration conditions children saw the model(s) remove the
Velcro strip and the corresponding compartment three times
for each compartment. In all demonstrations, the order of
opening each compartment was counterbalanced. In the 2 model
demonstration, models were the same sex and the compartments
they opened were counterbalanced between children. Conditions
are summarized in Table 1.
Measures
Trained coders analyzed the following responses and measures:
Target responses
There are a total of four target actions: (a) remove top Velcro
defense, (b) remove side Velcro defense, (c) lift using top handle,
(d) slide using top/side handle (c.f., Figure 1). The execution of
each target response was coded as +1.
Errors
We code four types of errors: (a) trying to lift without removing
the top defense, (b) trying to slide without removing the side
defense, (c) trying to open the opposite side of the box, which was
not operable, and (d) breaking apart the box by inappropriately
opening a compartment (e.g., lifting the entire top compartment).
Each error was coded as −1.
Fidelity score
This was a composite score that included the total number
of target responses (+0–4) plus points for executing the
individual target actions in the exact same order demonstrated
by the model, including matching the demonstrated order
of removing defenses (+0–1) and lifting/sliding actions (+0–
1), minus the total number of errors (−0–4). Total ﬁdelity
score range: −4 to 6. This composite score measured how
well individuals’ responses matched those demonstrated by the
model(s) while excluding individual trial-and-error learning (e.g.,
by subtracting errors) or the use of idiosyncratic means to achieve
the same result—emulation learning—(by evaluating order of
target responses). Fidelity scores could only be generated for
the demonstration conditions because the Baseline condition
included no demonstration prior to testing as such there was no
way to assess whether responses matched those of the model or
not.
Opening Style
To further disambiguate imitation from emulation and establish a
baseline rate of spontaneously opening the box using a particular
method, we also evaluated whether children adopted a particular
opening style. Speciﬁcally, there were two types of opening styles
we evaluated, an alternating style (RO-RO) and a blocked style
(RR-OO). Children in the demonstration conditions were given
a score of 1 if they matched the opening style used by the model
and a score of 0 if they did not.
Opened Both Compartments
This was a binomial measure that assessesd whether children
opened both the upper and lower compartment of the box at
least one time. If children opened both compartment one or more
times they were given a score of 1. If they opened only 1 or neither
compartment they were given a score of 0.
Two of the studies authors (AE, EK) and a third independent
coder not involved with data collection or familiar with the
study’s aims coded all responses (Experiments 1 and 2: AE;
TABLE 1 | Summary of learning conditions.
Learning condition Experiment 1: demonstration type:
RO-RO
Experiment 2: demonstration type:
RR-OO
Experiment 3: demonstration type:
OO-RR
Baseline No demonstration was provided No demonstration was provided No demonstration was provided
1 Model Model 1: removes first defense then
opens corresponding compartment (R,
O). Model 1: removes second defense
then opens corresponding
compartment (R, O). Repeats two more
times
Model 1: removes both defenses (R, R).
Repeats two more times. A white
barrier obscures the child’s view of the
box (∼5 s). The box is prepared for the
second demonstration. Model 1: opens
both compartments (O, O). Repeats
two more times
Model 1: opens both compartments (O,
O). Repeats two more times. A white
barrier obscures the child’s view of the
box (∼5 s). The box is prepared for the
second demonstration. Model 1:
removes both defenses (R, R). Repeats
two more times
2 Models Model 1: removes first defense then
opens corresponding compartment (R,
O). Repeats two more times. Model 2:
removes second defense then opens
corresponding compartment (R, O).
Repeats two more times
Model 1: removes both defenses (R, R).
Repeats two more times. A white
barrier obscures the child’s view of the
box (∼5 s). The box is prepared for the
second demonstration. Model 2: opens
both compartments (O, O). Repeats
two more times
Model 1: opens both compartments (O,
O). Repeats two more times. A white
barrier obscures the child’s view of the
box (∼5 s). The box is prepared for the
second demonstration. Model 2:
removes both defenses (R, R). Repeats
two more times
Videos of each of the demonstration conditions can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zu3CNXoIaOs&index=1&list=PLft-Ni1aB5CWD
NRHotwvc5Mid0pRNKx-). Table summarizes the differences between the learning conditions.
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Experiment 3: EK). Inter-rater agreement (between AK or EK
and a third independent coder) was high, κ = 0.75–0.98, across
measures and studies (Experiments 1–3).
Statistical Analysis
We used non-parametric statistics when assessing binary or
discontinuous measures such as the opening style score, opening
both compartments and error type (Experiment 3). Parametric
analyses were used for all other measures unless otherwise
speciﬁed.
Results
Was Learning in the Demonstration Conditions Better
than Baseline?
Preliminary analyses showed no reliable indication of age or
gender eﬀects, so these factors were not analyzed further.
A Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing target
responses across conditions (Baseline, 1 model, 2 model)
was statistically signiﬁcant [F(2,74) = 19.59, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.35]. Pairwise comparisons showed that children in
both demonstration conditions made signiﬁcantly more target
responses (M1 = 3.82, 95% CI [3.48, 4.15], M2 = 3.93 [3.65,
4.22]) than children in Baseline (MB = 2.68 [2.36, 2.99],
ps < 0.001, d1−B = 1.14 [0.57, 1.70], d2−B = 1.25 [0.73,
1.78]). The diﬀerence between the demonstration conditions
(d2−1 = 0.12 [−0.43, 0.66], p = 1.0) was not statistically
signiﬁcant.
We also compared the number of errors made by children in
the diﬀerent learning conditions. Results showed that there was
a main eﬀect for learning condition [F(2,74) = 19.26, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.34]. Pairwise comparisons revealed that children in the
demonstration conditions (M1 = 0.27, 95% CI [0.05, 0.49],
M2 = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.12, 0.26]) made signiﬁcantly fewer errors
than children in Baseline (MB = 0.92, 95% CI [0.71, 1.13],
ps < 0.001, d1−B = 0.65 [−1.02, −0.27], d2−B = −0.85 [−1.20,
−0.51]). The diﬀerences between the demonstration conditions
were not statistically signiﬁcant (d1−2 = 0.21, 95% CI [−0.15,
0.56], p = 0.49, all tests are Bonferroni adjusted). Results are
summarized in Table 2.
Given that children in the demonstration conditions clearly
evidenced social learning by virtue of generating more target
responses than children in Baseline, we did not analyze Baseline
performance further.
Was there Evidence of Imitation by Combination or
Summative Imitation?
93% (28/30) of children in the 2 model condition opened
both compartments, retrieving both stickers. This rate of
response diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the Baseline rate (M = 0.32,
Z = −4.72, p < 0.001, eﬀect size r = 0.53, Mann–Whitney
test). Among children in the 2 model condition who opened
both compartments, 96% (27/28) used the demonstrated—
alternating—method, where children removed a defense and then
opened the corresponding compartment (RO-RO). Again, these
rates diﬀered from the Baseline rate of spontaneously using the
RO-RO method (Z = −2.95, p < 0.01, r = 34, Mann–Whitney
test).
Did Imitation Fidelity Differ Between the 1 and 2
Model Demonstration Conditions?
Fidelity scores were higher in the 2 model condition (M2 = 4.43
[4.41, 4.80]) than the 1 model condition (M1 = 3.68 [3.26, 4.11]),
and this diﬀerence (M2−1 = −0.75 [−1.31, −0.19]) reached
signiﬁcance [F(2,49) = 7.31, p = 0.009, η2 = 0.13, Univariate
ANOVA). Results are summarized in Figure 2A.
Discussion
Results show that children successfully imitate diﬀerent events
demonstrated by diﬀerent models, solving a novel problem
by summative imitation. Speciﬁcally, children in the 2 model
demonstration condition generated more target responses and
opened both compartments more often than children in Baseline.
Unexpectedly, children in the 2 model condition imitated with
greater ﬁdelity when compared to children in the 1 model
condition. This diﬀerence is best explained by the fact that
children in the 2 model condition made (marginally) fewer
errors. These results conﬁrm that children are not only adept at
imitating with high-ﬁdelity the responses of a single model but
that they can imitate with high-ﬁdelity across multiple models
and eﬀectively sum up diﬀerent modeled actions or events to
achieve a novel goal.
However, because models demonstrated an alternating
technique where compartments were opened immediately after
TABLE 2 | Mean (SD) for the various measures used to evaluate performance.
Experiment: demonstration Model condition Target responses Opened both compartments Errors Fidelity
Experiment 1: None Baseline 2.68 (1.28) 0.32 0.92 (0.70) N/A
Experiment 1: RO-RO 1 Model 3.82 (0.50)∗ 0.86∗ 0.27 (0.55)∗ 3.62 (1.13)
Experiment 1: RO-RO 2 Model 3.93 (0.25)∗ 0.93∗ 0.07 (0.25)∗ 4.43 (0.86)
Experiment 2: RR-OO 1 Model 3.33 (1.27) 0.74∗ 0.92 (1.11) 2.44 (2.81)
Experiment 2: RR-OO 2 Model 3.61 (0.96)∗ 0.78∗ 0.75 (0.93) 2.93 (2.23)
Experiment 3: OO-RR 1 Model 3.28 (0.39) 0.56 1.16 (0.46) N/A
Experiment 4: OO-RR 2 Model 3.48 (0.34) 0.78∗ 1.57 (0.49)∗ N/A
Demonstrations included two types of actions, remove defense (R) and open compartment (O). How these different actions were demonstrated was manipulated in each
Experiment.
∗Significantly different when compared to Baseline, p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean imitation fidelity score in the 1 and 2 model
demonstrations conditions: (A) Experiment 1 and (B) Experiment 2.
∗p < 0.05.
the removal of a defense, it is possible that children may not
have imitated but rather learned about the causal aﬀordances
associated with opening the box. That is, each defense had
to be removed in order to open each compartment. To test
this alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 evaluated whether children evidence summative
imitation when the actions (i.e., defense removal or R) and the
goals (opening compartment or O) are temporally and causally
disconnected and demonstrated by diﬀerent models (e.g., RR-
OO). If children are learning about the causal aﬀordances of the
task, rather than imitating by combining the model’s responses,
then they should open the box using the alternating technique
(i.e., RO-RO) as opposed to the demonstrated method (RR-OO).
To that end, Experiment 2 sought to replicate the results of
Experiment 1 and, additionally, address whether children can
learn by summative imitation in a more causally opaque task
where 1 model removes both defenses and another opens both
compartments.
Hypotheses: Same as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
An additional 55 children (Females= 28) ranging in age from 3 to
5 years (M = 3.98, SD = 0.80) were recruited and tested using the
same procedures described above for Experiment 1. Two children
were excluded due to experimenter error.
Task
Same as in Experiment 1.
Procedures
All procedures were identical to those of Experiment 1 except
that a large white poster board was used to conceal the box
before, between, and after demonstrations to obscure additional
manipulations to prepare the box—limiting access to causal
information. Children were tested in one of the following social
learning conditions.
Baseline
Because this was a trial and error learning condition, we
did not re-collect Baseline data for Experiment 2. As such,
we compared performance in Experiment 2 with Baseline
performance collected for Experiment 1.
1 Model Demonstration
A model approached the box, said “Watch me,” removed both
defenses (RR) then returned the box to its original state. This
procedure was repeated two more times (three demonstrations
removing defenses). Following the third demonstration, a white
barrier obscured the child’s view of the box (∼3–5 s) during
which time the box was prepared for the second demonstration.
Once the box was reconﬁgured, the same model said “Watch
me,” then opened both compartments (OO). Once the model
opened each compartment, the model closed both compartments.
This procedure was repeated twomore times (three opening both
compartments).
2 Model Demonstration
One model approached the box, said “Watch me,” removed both
defenses (RR) in succession and then returned the box to its
original state, repeating two more times (three demonstrations
removing defenses). Following the third demonstration, a third
experimenter obscured the child’s view of the box (∼5 s) with
a white barrier during which time the box was prepared for
the second demonstration by a diﬀerent model. Speciﬁcally, the
defenses were removed and placed in front of the box. Before
the barrier was raised again, the ﬁrst model walked out of view
of the child. At this point, the barrier was raised (by a third
experimenter), a second model approached the box, said “Watch
me” then demonstrated opening each compartment in succession
(OO). Following each demonstration, the model closed both
compartments. This procedure was repeated two more times
(three demonstrations opening compartments). Following the
third demonstration, the model walked out of view of the child.
All other aspects of the procedures were identical to those
described above for Experiment 1.
Following both demonstration conditions (1 or 2 models), the
third experimenter then asked children the number of stickers
in the box. Regardless of their answer, the third experimenter
encouraged the child to ﬁnd the two stickers in the box using
the same procedures described for Experiment 1. See Table 1 for
diﬀerences between learning conditions across Experiments.
In both 1 and 2 model demonstration conditions children
saw an equal number of demonstrations removing defenses
and opening compartments. In both demonstration types,
the resulting demonstration followed a blocked pattern,
RR – OO, where actions (defense removal) and goals (opening
compartments) were presented separately. In all demonstrations,
the order of opening each compartment was counterbalanced. In
the 2 model demonstration, models were the same sex and, as in
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the 1 model demonstration condition, the compartments they
opened were counterbalanced between children.
Coding, Measures, and Hypotheses
Same as Experiment 1.
Results
Was Learning in the Demonstration Conditions Better
than Baseline?
Preliminary analysis showed a reliable indication of age eﬀects
but not gender eﬀects, so age was included as a covariate
in subsequent analyses. A Univariate ANOVA comparing the
number of target responses across groups (Baseline, 1 model,
2 model) and including age as a covariate was signiﬁcant
[F(2,79) = 3.838, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.09]. Corrected for age,
the demonstration conditions showed a linear pattern, with
performance in the 2 model condition being the highest
(M2 = 3.57 [3.14, 4.01]), followed by 1 Model (M1 = 3.34 [2.91,
3.79]) and, ﬁnally, Baseline (MB = 2.78 [2.26, 3.28]). Pairwise
comparisons showed that only the 2 model condition was reliably
better than Baseline (M2−B = 0.85 [0.78, 1.61], p = 0.03;
M1−B = 0.63 [−0.15, 1.39, p = 0.16], Bonferroni adjusted). The
performance in the 2model condition was not reliably better than
performance in the 1 Model condition, however (M2−1 = 0.23
[−0.52, 0.98], p = 0.31, Bonferroni adjusted). As in Experiment
1 we compared the number of errors made by children in the
diﬀerent learning conditions. Results showed that there was no
main eﬀect for learning condition [F(2,74) = 2.73, p = 0.73,
η2 = 0.01]. Results are summarized in Table 2.
Was there Evidence of Imitation by Combination or
Summative Imitation?
79% (22/28) of children in the 2 model condition opened both
compartments, retrieving both stickers. This rate of response
signiﬁcantly diﬀered from Baseline rates (M = 0.32, Z = −3.52,
p < 0.001, r = 0.50, Mann–Whitney test). Of the children in
the 2 model condition who opened both compartments, 90%
(20/22) used the demonstrated—blocked—method (RR-OO).
Again, these rates diﬀered from Baseline rates of spontaneously
using the RR-OO method (Z = −6.14, p < 0.001, r = 0.87,
Mann–Whitney test). Results are summarized in Table 2.
Did Imitation Fidelity Differ between the 1 and the 2
Model Demonstration Conditions?
Preliminary analyses revealed that imitation ﬁdelity did not diﬀer
by age so age was excluded from further analysis. While imitation
ﬁdelity was greater in the 2 model (M = 4.43 [3.38, 5.47]) than
in the 1 model demonstration condition (M = 3.85 [2.78, 4.92]),
this diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant [F(1,54) = 0.559,
p= 0.44, η2 = 0.01, Univariate ANOVA]. Results are summarized
in Figure 2B.
Discussion
Results from Experiment 2 largely replicate those reported
for Experiment 1 using a more challenging procedure than
the one used in Experiment 1 where actions and goals were
presented separately. This feature of the demonstration made
the causal link between removing the defenses before opening
a compartment ambiguous. As such, it should not be surprising
that children generally performed worse across demonstration
groups in comparison to children in Experiment 1. This result is
consistent with work by Bauer (1992) and Bauer and Hertsgaard
(1993) showing that in an elicited imitation task, young children
recall events that are causally linked more eﬀectively than
event sequences that are arbitrarily associated. In contrast to
the results of Experiment 1, children’s ﬁdelity scores in the
2 model condition was not signiﬁcantly better than those of
children in the 1 model condition. One reason for this might
have to do with the introduction of the barrier in between
demonstrations which might have added to children’s cognitive
load. Nonetheless, as in Experiment 1, children in the 2 model
condition not only generated signiﬁcantly more target responses
and opened both compartments more often than children in
Baseline, their imitation ﬁdelity did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from that of children in the 1 model demonstration condition.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that summative
imitation—imitatively combining diﬀerent actions demonstrated
by two or more models—is equivalent to imitative learning from
a single model (where no combination is required).
The fact that children in the 2 model condition adopted
the style demonstrated (i.e., RR-OO) rather than an alternative
method (e.g., RO-RO), shows that children were imitating the
demonstrated technique rather than achieving the same goal
via aﬀordance learning, end-state emulation or goal emulation
(Whiten, 2008; Whiten et al., 2009). Children in Experiment 2,
however, performed slightly worse than those in Experiment 1.
This diﬀerence may be explained by the fact that children in
Experiment 2 generally paused after opening each compartment
to remove the sticker (increasing trial duration). Pausing to
retrieve stickers likely increased the likelihood of forgetting
which target actions had already been achieved, resulting in the
repetition of already completed target responses or the execution
of irrelevant responses such as closing opened compartments
after the sticker had been removed. Other researchers have
reported similar response patterns (e.g., Horner and Whiten,
2005).
Nonetheless, Experiments 1 and 2 makes clear that children
imitate each event demonstrated with great ﬁdelity, regardless
of whether those events are demonstrated by 1 or 2 models.
However, it is less clear whether children in the 1 and 2
model condition encode the two diﬀerent action events (RR,
OO) the same way. Speciﬁcally, whether children in the 1
and 2 model demonstration condition encode events ﬂexibly,
whereby, for example, RR and OO can be recalled in diﬀerent
orders (i.e., RR – OO or OO – RR) or whether they are
encoded and subsequently recalled in the demonstrated order.
While learning may generally be comparable between 1 and
2 models, there might be diﬀerences in how ﬂexibly children
learn the sequence of events in each demonstration condition.
The work on overimitation suggests that when interacting with
artifacts children are remarkably inﬂexible, imitating with high-
ﬁdelity even when some of the action are causally meaningless
and costly (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Lyons, 2009). But, there
is also evidence that children imitate ﬂexibly and selectively,
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taking into consideration various social variables including the
social context (Nielsen et al., 2012), task-diﬃculty (Williamson
and Meltzoﬀ, 2011), physical constraints (Gergely et al., 2002)
and model’s intent (Lyons et al., 2011) to name a few (for a review
see: Over and Carpenter, 2012).
The relatively lower imitation ﬁdelity of children in the 1
model condition might suggest that children in that condition
are more ﬂexible and may imitate more selectively than children
in the 2 model demonstration condition. Perhaps the causal
aﬀordances in the 1 model condition were more salient than the
model’s actions, leading children to focus on the aﬀordances of
the task and less on speciﬁc actions. Alternatively, children in the
2 model condition may have done better, in general, not because
they imitated each model’s actions faithfully but because, in the
course of faithfully imitating each model’s actions, they learned
the causal constraints of the task better than children in the 1
model condition.
Having established that children can accurately combine
two diﬀerent demonstrated events across diﬀerent models in
Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 sought to assess the
ﬂexibility of children’s ability to imitatively combined diﬀerent
responses in the course of solving a novel problem by
summative imitation. To do this, Experiment 3 replicated the
methods used in Experiment 2 but reversed the order of the
events demonstrated: Children ﬁrst observed compartments
being opened prior to the defenses being removed, violating
causality.
Experiment 3
Methods
Participants
A total of 49 children (Females = 23), ranging in age
from 3 to 5 years (M = 3.88, SD = 0.73) were recruited
from the Discovery Room in the National Museum of
Natural History, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, DC,
USA.
One other child was tested but excluded due to experimenter
error. We received informed consent from participants’ parent(s)
or legal guardian(s), and we obtained informed assent from the
child immediately prior to testing.
Materials
Same as Experiments 1 and 2.
Experimental Groups
Same as in Experiment 2 with the following exception:
1 Model Demonstration
A model approached the box, said “Watch me,” opened the ﬁrst
compartment (O) and then proceeded to open the second (O)
compartment (O, O). This was repeated two additional times
(three demonstrations opening each compartment). After the
third demonstration, a third experimenter, brieﬂy, blocked the
child’s view of the box with a white barrier (∼5 s). During
this time, the Velcro defenses were added. Once defenses
were in place, the barrier was removed and the same model
said, “Watch me” then proceeded to remove each defense (R,
R) in sequence three consecutive times (three demonstrations
removing defenses).
2 Model Demonstration
The ﬁrst model approached the box, said “Watchme,” opened the
ﬁrst compartment (O) and then proceeded to open the second
(O) compartment (O, O). The same model then returned the box
to the starting state and repeated the demonstration two more
times (three demonstrations opening each compartments). After
the third demonstration, a third experimenter, brieﬂy, blocked
the child’s view of the box with a white barrier (∼5 s). During
this time, the Velcro defenses were added. Once defenses were
in place, the ﬁrst model walked out of view of the child, a third
experimenter removed the barrier, a second model approached
the box, said “Watch me” and demonstrated removing each
defense in sequence (R, R). The same model then returned the
box to the starting state and repeated the removal of defenses two
more times (three demonstrations removing defenses). Following
the third demonstration the second model walked out of view of
the child.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, following both demonstration
conditions (1 or 2 models), the third experimenter then asked
children the number of stickers in the box. Regardless of their
answer, the experimenter encouraged the child to ﬁnd the two
stickers in the box.
As in the previous experiments, the number of demonstrations
in the 1 and 2 model conditions was the same. In all
demonstrations, the order of opening each compartment was
counterbalanced as was the removal of defenses. All other
procedures were identical to those described for Experiment 1.
Please refer to Table 1 for a summary of the procedures in the
diﬀerent learning conditions across Experiments.
Note that in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, if children
imitate the model faithfully (by attempting to open the
compartments before removing the defenses) they will make lift
and/or slide error(s). Counter-intuitively, in Experiment 3, more
errors, speciﬁcally, more lift and/or slide errors, corresponds with
more faithful imitation.
Measures
Same as Experiments 1 and 2.
Statistical Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Did Children in the Demonstration Condition Make
More Target Responses than Children in Baseline?
Preliminary analyses revealed that age signiﬁcantly correlated
with target responses (r = 0.33, p < 0.01, Pearson correlation)
as such we included age as a covariate. A Univariate ANOVA
with number of target responses as the dependent measure,
number of models as a ﬁxed factor and age as a covariate
produced a main eﬀect for age [F(2,72) = 6.81, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.90] and a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect for number
of models [F(2,72) = 2.50, p = 0.09, η2 = 0.70]. However,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1410
Subiaul et al. Summative imitation
pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction procedure
revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between conditions, Baseline
vs. 1 vs. 2 models (all ps > 0.10). Results are summarized in
Table 2.
Did Children in the Demonstration Conditions
Successfully Open Both (Upper and Lower)
Compartments More Often than Children in Baseline?
As was done above in Experiments 1 and 2, Mann–Whitney
tests were used to compare 1 and 2 model demonstration
conditions to Baseline. When compared to children in Baseline
(MB = 0.32), signiﬁcantly more children in the 2 model
(M2 = 0.78) but not in the 1 model (M1 = 0.56) demonstration
condition opened both compartments (M1: Z = −1.69, p = 0.18,
r = 0.20; M2: Z = −3.07, r = 0.36, p < 0.01, p-values
are corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
procedure). In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, the high
frequency of errors made by children in Experiment 3 made
it diﬃcult to accurately estimate ﬁdelity scores as was done
in the previous studies. As such, these analyses are omitted
here.
Were there Differences in the Total Number of Errors
Children Made Across the Different Conditions?
Preliminary analysis revealed that age did not signiﬁcantly
correlate with the number of errors children made (r < 0.20,
p > 0.10), as such we did not analyze age further. A Univariate
ANOVA comparing the number of errors across learning
conditions was marginally signiﬁcant [F(2,72) = 3.01, p = 0.06,
η2 = 0.08). Children in the 2 model demonstration condition
made the most errors (M2 = 1.57 [1.18, 1.95], M1 = 1.16 [0.79,
1.53], MB = 0.92 [0.55, 1.29]). Pairwise comparisons showed
that children in the 2 Model condition made marginally more
errors than children in Baseline (M2−B = 0.65 [−0.88, 0.40],
p = 0.052; M1−B = 0.24 [−0.40, 0.88, p = 1.00], Bonferroni
adjusted). However, children in the 2 Model condition did not
reliably make more errors than children in the 1 model condition
(M2−1 = 0.41 [−0.25, 1.10], p = 0.39, Bonferroni adjusted).
Results are summarized in Table 2.
To disambiguate random errors from imitation-related errors,
we included an analysis of errors based on learning condition
(i.e., Baseline, 1 Model, 2 Model). Speciﬁcally, we analyzed
whether there were diﬀerences in the types of errors children
made across learning conditions. Children in the 1 and 2 models
demonstration conditions did not make diﬀerent types of errors
(all Zs < 1.50, ps > 0.10, rs < 0.18, Mann–Whitney test).
However, compared to Baseline, children in both demonstration
conditions made signiﬁcantly more demonstration-related errors
(slide: Z = −3.05, p < 0.03, r = 0.43, lift errors: Z = 2.92,
p < 0.03, r = 0.41) as well as one non-demonstration
related error such as interacting with the wrong side of
the box (wrong side: Z = −2.55, p = 0.03, r = 0.36).
Learning conditions did not diﬀer in terms of breaking the
box while trying to ﬁnd the stickers (destroy: Z = −1.40,
p = 0.48, r = 0.20). All analyses have been corrected for
multiple comparisons using Bonferroni Procedure. Results are
summarized in Figure 3.
Did Children in the Demonstration Conditions of
Experiment 3 Make More Errors than Children in the
Demonstration Conditions of Experiments 1 and 2?
To answer this question we performed a Univariate ANOVA
that included number of errors as the dependent measure
and experiment (1–3) and number of models (0, 1, 2) as
ﬁxed factors. Results showed a main eﬀect for Experiment,
F(2,229) = 17.92, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.14, but not for
number of models [F(2,229) = 0.64, p = 0.53, η2 = 0.01].
There was also a signiﬁcant interaction between number
of models and Experiment, F(4,229) = 5.67, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.09. To understand the number of models by Experiment
interaction, recall that in Experiment 1 children in both
demonstration conditions (M1 andM2) made signiﬁcantly fewer
errors than children in Baseline. Whereas, in Experiment 3,
children in the 2 Model (but not 1 model demonstration)
condition made marginally more errors than children in
Baseline. In Experiment 2, children in the demonstration
conditions made as many errors as children in Baseline.
Pairwise comparisons showed that children in Experiment
1 (M1 = 0.42 [0.24, 0.60]) made signiﬁcantly fewer errors
than children in Experiment 2 (M2 = 0.87 [0.69, 1.04];
M1−2 = −0.45, p = 0.002 [−0.76, −0.13]) and Experiment
3 (M3 = 1.22 [1.02, 1.40]; M1−3 = −0.80, p < 0.001
[−1.12, −0.47]). Moreover, children in Experiment 2 made
fewer errors than children in Experiment 3 (M2−3 = −0.35
[−0.67, −0.03], p < 0.01, all comparisons are Bonferroni
corrected).
The likeliest explanation for this seemingly paradoxical result
is that in the present study, children made more errors because
they were more faithfully generating the responses of the
models in the order demonstrated than children in the 1
model demonstration condition, as was the case in Experiment
1. Because the model demonstrated opening the box before
demonstrating the removal of the defenses, children in the
demonstration conditions made a signiﬁcantly high number of
lift and slide errors, which were the responses they ﬁrst observed
the model make.
Given that there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between 1
and 2 model demonstration conditions, we collapsed across
demonstration conditions to compare individual error types
between the three diﬀerent experiments using a Kruskal–Wallis
test. Results showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of slide
and lift errors between experiments [Slide Error: χ2(2) = 24.72,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11, Lift Error: χ2(2) = 34.60, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.14; Wrong Side: χ2(2) = 1.70, p = 0.43, η2 < 0.01;
Destroy = χ2(2) = 1.62, p = 0.44, η2 < 0.01, Kruskal–Wallis
test]. A post-host analysis using a Mann–Whitney test revealed
that more children in Experiments 2 and 3 made slide (EXP2−1:
Z = −3.20, p < 0.001, r = 0.26, EXP3−1: Z = 4.92, p < 0.001,
r = 0.40) and lift errors (EXP2−1: Z = −4.76, p< 0.001, r = 0.38,
EXP3−1: Z = −5.66, p < 0.001, r = 0.46) than children in
Experiment 1. Children in Experiment 3 made signiﬁcantly more
slide errors (EXP3−2: Z= −2.31, p= 0.04, r= 0.19), but not more
lift errors than children in Experiment 2 (EXP3−2: Z = −1.23,
p = 0.52, r = 0.09, all analysis are two-tailed and Bonferroni
adjusted).
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FIGURE 3 | Summary of error types by condition and experiment.
Discussion
Analysis of both target responses and errors in Experiment
3 are consistent with prior research showing that in the
artifact domain, preschool age children are high-ﬁdelity—
overimitators—copying all demonstrated responses with little
ﬂexibility and regardless of their causal necessity or cost (Lyons
et al., 2007, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2014a). Here, children in the 1
and 2 model demonstration conditions, after observing a model
ﬁrst opening the compartments and then removing the defenses
(a violation of causality) followed suite, attempting to open the
compartments as demonstrated, resulting in a high frequency
of Slide and Lift Errors. These errors are notable as they were
generally absent in the Baseline condition (c.f., Figure 3), serving
as a proxy measure of social learning and imitation ﬁdelity. And,
as in Experiments 1 and 2, there was a non-signiﬁcant trend
for children in the 2 model demonstration condition to make
more errors overall than children in the 1 model demonstration
condition. Despite this high-frequency of errors, children in
the 2 model demonstration condition, nonetheless, opened
both compartments at rates greater than Baseline, evidence
of summative imitation. The same was not true of children
in the 1 model demonstration condition. While the 1 and 2
model demonstrations did not statistically diﬀer, these results,
nonetheless, suggest that children in the 2 model condition,
generally, encoded and subsequently recalled the demonstrated
events better than children in the 1 model condition.
General Discussion
Overall, results showed that children in Experiments 1–3 showed
robust evidence of summative imitation, imitatively combining
diﬀerent responses across diﬀerent models to achieve a novel goal
in a problem-solving task. Children in Experiment 2 succeeded
in learning by summative imitation even when actions and
goals were causally dislocated and presented by diﬀerent models,
making the function of responses opaque and the task more
challenging. The ﬂexibility of learning by summative imitation
was further tested in Experiment 3. Results showed that children
reproduced the demonstrated events (i.e., attempting to open
compartments prior to removing defenses) as shown and failed to
ﬂexibly recombine the demonstrated events (i.e., remove defenses
before opening compartments) prior to their ﬁrst responses. As a
result, children in Experiment 3 made signiﬁcantly more errors
than children in Experiment 1 (but not Experiment 2). However,
after their ﬁrst response, children evidenced more ﬂexibility. For
instance, following the ﬁrst response, where children generally
attempted to open a compartment without ﬁrst removing the
defense, children in the 2 model condition generated more target
responses and successfully opened both compartments relative
to children in Baseline. This result is consistent with a number
of other studies showing that children are sensitive to their own
mistakes in social learning tasks as well as the diﬃculty of the task
(Williamson and Meltzoﬀ, 2011; Wood et al., 2013). In one social
learning study, children changed a previously rewarded response
to a new alternative response demonstrated by a model (Wood
et al., 2013). Children’s performance in the present study is
consistent with these other studies and suggests that after making
an error, children reconﬁgured, and perhaps restructured, the
events they observed: removing the defenses prior to opening the
compartments.
While there was some evidence that across experiments
children in the 2 model condition learned better (albeit, often
marginally so) than children in the 1 model demonstration
condition, the underlying cognitive representations guiding
responses in the 1 and 2 model condition do not appear to diﬀer,
given the similarity in children’s responses. An analysis of error
patterns, for instance, showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between 1
and 2 model demonstration conditions. Diﬀerent representations
underlying children’s performance in the 1 vs. 2model conditions
should have resulted in more robust and consistent diﬀerences in
performance. Consider children’s performance in Experiment 3.
Had children in the 1 model condition generated one continuous
representation of the two action events, and children in the
2 model condition generated two independent representations
of each action event that could be re-arranged ﬂexibly, then
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children in the 2 model condition should have made fewer
errors, than children in the 1 model condition. Yet, there were
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in either the total number or the
types of errors made by children in the two demonstration
conditions.
There was also a tendency across Experiments for children in
the 2 model condition to make more target responses relative
to Baseline and imitate with higher ﬁdelity (Experiment 1)
than children in the 1 model demonstration condition. There
are several possible explanations for this. First, the 2 model
demonstration condition presented the same information as the
1 model demonstration condition in two discrete “chunks.” It
has long been recognized in the cognitive sciences that grouping
information into meaningful clusters has a facilitative eﬀect on
both encoding and recall (Miller, 1956; Terrace, 2001). While
the present study was not designed to test such a possibility,
it is nonetheless, possible that a type of ‘social chunking’ may
explain the facilitative eﬀect of learning diﬀerent information
from multiple models. However, besides improving encoding
and recall, the present study oﬀers no robust evidence that such
chunking fundamentally altered how children in the 1 and 2
models demonstration conditions represented observed events.
Second, as previously stated, observing multiple models has
a facilitative eﬀect on social learning (Bandura and Menlove,
1968; Schunk, 1987; Herrmann et al., 2013). One explanation
for this facilitative eﬀect may have to do with the fact that
multiple models provide the child not just with more information
but also with “normative” or culture-speciﬁc information which
may add to the salience of the actions demonstrated (Keupp
et al., 2013), increasing imitation ﬁdelity (Herrmann et al.,
2013).
Nonetheless, the unique temporal and spatial constraints
associated with summative imitation might engage causal
reasoning in a way that learning from a single model might
not. As a result, certain summative imitation paradigms
using diﬀerent tasks and procedures might lead to distinct
representations in the 1 vs. 2+ model demonstration conditions.
As of yet, we do not know how (and whether) children combine
diﬀerent responses from models who are temporally as well as
spatially separated.
The result that children tended to copy the speciﬁc (and
causally ineﬀective) action sequence over the goal of the task,
stands in contrast with results from another study showing that
when executing diﬀerent action sequences on diﬀerent tasks,
3-years-old copy the goal structure of the sequences over the
sequential structure of the demonstrated actions (Loucks and
Meltzoﬀ, 2013). Had children in Experiment 3, for example,
encoded the goal structure rather than the speciﬁc sequence
structure, they would have made few errors while opening the
problem box. This discrepancy may be explained by the fact
that in the present study models performed diﬀerent actions
sequences on diﬀerent parts of the same apparatus, whereas in
the Loucks and Meltzoﬀ (2013) study a model demonstrated
diﬀerent action sequences on diﬀerent tasks. Together, these
results conﬁrm that task type matters when learning by
imitation (Subiaul et al., 2012, 2014). While children must
regularly disambiguate multiple action sequences performed
across diﬀerent tasks (e.g., doing laundry and folding clothes),
it is also the case that children must learn that the same object
has multiple functional properties (e.g., the same tool may be
used to hammer, cut or scrape). Both are critical aspects of
cultural learning that may be represented diﬀerently in the
brain. Understanding ‘why’ is a question that merits further
exploration.
A possible limitation is that children observed the model
reconﬁgure the box following each demonstration, proving
children with additional causal information. However, the fact
that children faithfully replicated the demonstrated technique
even in Experiment 3 (i.e., attempting to open the compartments
prior to removing the defenses) shows that children were not
problem-solving by aﬀordance learning, at least, not on the
ﬁrst trial. It is also an open question whether children are
able to combine information if demonstrations are separated by
long time intervals, as they might in a more natural setting.
Results might also change if the demonstrations are separated
spatially or presented across diﬀerent mediums, such as video.
While beyond the scope of the present study, answering these
questions will shed light on the versatility and ﬂexibility of
children (and adults’) social and imitation learning skills as well
as insight into the underlying cognitive systems mediating such
learning.
The high-ﬁdelity of children’s summative imitation indicates
that learning and combining diﬀerent types of information
from multiple models may represent a more natural method
or at least as natural and eﬃcient a method as learning from
a single model. It is certainly the case that in the physical
domain, children are adept at synthesizing multiple pieces of
information to make causal inferences (c.f., Gopnik and Schulz,
2004). The present study shows that children are equally adept
at synthesizing diﬀerent sources of social information in order
to generate novel responses and solutions to complex problems.
It is an open question whether the same causal processes used
to synthesize information in the physical domain is responsible
for piecing together diﬀerent responses across models in the
social domain, as some have suggested (Buchsbaum et al.,
2012).
While the present study shows that children possess a
mechanism that involves combining information across multiple
models—summative imitation—it does not explain the range of
information that can be learned and combined by summative
imitation. The use of a problem box limited us to studying
only problem-solving or innovation via combination (Lewis and
Laland, 2012) and provided little room for novel innovation,
as each possible manipulation of the box was demonstrated
in all demonstration conditions. So, an important limitation
of the present study is that results showed that children
can solve a relatively simple problem by combining diﬀerent
responses by multiple models. However, we see this set of
studies as a necessary ﬁrst step for future research which should
explore whether summative imitation may result in truly “novel”
innovations involving more complex tasks or innovations that
lead to better or more eﬃcient solutions to problems (e.g.,
innovation via modiﬁcation). But such limitations should not
diminish the novelty and importance of these results, namely,
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that children despite more distractors (e.g., diﬀerent models
coming and going, delays between demonstrations), increasing
the likelihood for errors, accurately imitated two distinct action
events presented by two diﬀerent models to solve a novel
problem.
Conclusion
While researchers disagree as to whether high-ﬁdelity imitation
is necessary for cumulative culture, there is a general consensus
that cumulative culture requires both the creation (problem-
solving/innovation) and social transfer (social learning) of
others’ responses and knowledge (Tomasello et al., 2005; Boyd
et al., 2011; Dean et al., 2012; Lewis and Laland, 2012;
Legare and Nielsen, in press). But, to date, these research
questions have been explored independently of one another,
with research focusing on children’s ability to innovate or
imitate in problem-solving tasks separately (e.g., Cutting et al.,
2011, 2014; Beck et al., 2012). One reason for this being
that while innovation has been conceptualized as an asocial—
individual—learning process (Ramsey et al., 2007), imitation
is thought of as the quintessential social learning mechanism
(Over and Carpenter, 2012). This dissociation, however, has
been challenged by meta-analyses showing that there is a
strong association between social learning and problem-solving
or innovation (Reader et al., 2011) and by computational
models demonstrating that both high-ﬁdelity imitation along
with the combination of others’ actions (i.e., innovation by
combination) best predicts cumulative culture (Lewis and Laland,
2012).
Here, we sought to empirically explore whether at least one
type of problem-solving—innovation by combination (Lewis and
Laland, 2012)—may be achieved by imitation. Results showed
that preschool age children successfully opened a novel problem
box by combining two diﬀerent actions demonstrated by two
diﬀerent models, a process we refer to as summative imitation.
Though previous studies have described young children as
“cultural magnets” (Flynn, 2008), the psychological mechanisms
supporting and furthering cultural evolution are very much
in doubt (Caldwell and Millen, 2009; Call and Tennie, 2009;
Heyes, 2012). Given the results reported here, we would like
to further the hypothesis that the ease and ﬁdelity with which
young children combine information across models—summative
imitation—may serve as a mechanism for cultural evolution by
propagating and generating novel solutions to problems that in
some contexts may lead to truly novel innovations.
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